The Great Demand Depression by Weder, Mark












This paper entertains the notion that disturbances on the demand
side play a central role in our understanding of the Great Depression.
In fact, from Euler equation residuals we are able to identify a series of
unusually large negative demand shocks that appeared to have hit the
U. S. economy during the 1930s. This echoes the view originally pro-
moted by Temin (1976). We apply these measured demand shocks to a
dynamic general equilibrium model and …nd that size and sequence of
shocks can generate a pattern of the model economy that is not unlike
data. The model is able to account for the lion’s share of the decline
in economic activity and is able to exaggerate realistic persistence.
¤I am indebted to Michael Burda, Lisa Topelmann, Carsten Trenkler and Harald Uhlig
for helpful discussions. Keywords : Great Depression, Demand Shocks, Dynamic General
Equilibrium. JEL Classi…cations : E32
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”A clear distinction between the patterns of pre-and-post-World War II
data is the larger size of aggregate demand shocks during the earlier period.”
(Bradford DeLong and Lawrence Summers, 1986, p. 680)
1 Introduction
The Great Depression in the United States, in all its many dimensions,
stands unparalleled. Real output cumulatively declined by about 30 percent
between 1929-1933 which dwarfs any post-war business cycle and the rate
of unemployment elevated to unique heights by reaching 25 percent. Yet,
perhaps the most perplexing aspect of the Great Depression is that the econ-
omy remained depressed for so long. It did not return to full employment
until after the outbreak of World War II and for a long time staggered at
levels that seem too low to square with the normal mechanisms of business
cycles. Speci…cally, real GNP did not reach its pre-Depression value until
1936 and per capita output still remained twenty-…ve percent below trend
in 1939. The recovery phase lasted seven years – four times the average
post-war recovery period.
Recent work in dynamic general equilibrium shows that the tepid recov-
ery remains a conundrum for a wide range of models such as the perfect
markets Real Business Cycle approach as well as for sticky price monetary
models. In particular, measured total factor productivity reverted to trend
by 1936. Thus, by putting the Real Business Cycle model into action, theory
predicts an end of the Depression by the mid-thirties (Cole and Ohanian,
1999). Likewise, the Federal Reserve followed an expansionary policy start-
ing in 1933. Money supply – measured as M1 – grew at spectacular growth
rates of ten percent per year between 1933 and 1937. Again, theory pre-
dicts a strong and comparatively rapid recovery (Bordo, Erceg and Evans,
2000). These …ndings are related to the often stressed viewpoint that the
United States’ adherence to the Gold Standard was a crucial element of the
economic decline (Eichengreen, 1992): countries that abandoned the Gold
Standard early, such as the Scandinavians, experienced the Great Depression
through little more than ordinary recessions and returned to normal levels of
economic activity by the mid-1930s. However, the U.S. administration only
suspended its commitment to gold in January 1932 – the Glass-Steagall Act
which meant that the gold above a statutory minimum was now entirely
”free”; the United States imposed a full embargo on gold exports in the
Spring of that following year. This all suggests that important nonmone-
tary, domestic forces which kept the economy o¤ track must have been at
work throughout most of the 1930s.
Accordingly, research founded in dynamic general equilibrium shifted
its focus to changes in the institutional framework as being predominantly
responsible for the persistence of the Depression (Cole and Ohanian, 2000,
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as well as Bordo, Erceg and Evans, 2000). Particular emphasis is thereby
placed on New Deal cartelization policies and bargaining processes. These
institutional factors in‡ated real wages in large parts of the economy. This
distortion, it is argued, emerges as an essential piece in the puzzle of the
sluggish recovery in the 1930s. Still, Cole and Ohanian’s (2000, see their
Table 13) model, which takes into account the institutional changes, closes
the gap between the perfect market Real Business Cycle model and U.S.
output by only a half and misses the 1937-1938 recession – the third largest
recession in American history in terms of output loss – altogether.
The current paper approaches the Great Depression from a disparate
perspective. Our point of departure is Temin’s (1976) insistence on con-
tractions of aggregate demand distinctly during the …rst stage of the Great
Depression.1 What evidence does Temin muster to support his proposition?
The centerpiece of his argument rests on an episodic pattern of consumption
which bears no resemblance to that of other recessions. Temin reports that
consumption fell by 5.4 percent from 1929 to 1930. This is unique behavior
when compared to other economic downturns. For example, Temin reports
that during the 1920-1921 recession, consumption had increased by 6.4 per-
cent. He identi…es large residuals from estimated Keynesian consumption
functions for the onset of the Great Depression. He stresses that investment
took similar sudden hits. In an old-fashioned interpretation, Temin classi…es
these shocks as the collapse of autonomous spending. Romer (1990) picks up
on this observation and cites an increasing state of uncertainty following the
October 1929 stock market crash. Indeed, she …nds that this uncertainty
led to delaying the expenditures on durable goods.
Temin’s original formulation remains in the con…nes of the old Keynesian
apparatus. In contrast, the present model is framed within methodological
standards that are set and met by the Real Business Cycle approach. It
applies Temin’s interpretation to a fully articulated dynamic general equi-
librium framework in which demand shocks drive economic ‡uctuations. If
the Great Depression was such an equilibrium, the model should be able to
replicate the behavior of key macroeconomic aggregates during that time.
Our strategy of estimating demand shocks from data stems from Hall’s
(1986) analysis of the role of consumption in the U.S. business cycle. His
work was …rst to propose a framework that allows demand shocks to be
computed readily within the framework of dynamic optimization. Baxter
and King (1991) construct a dynamic general equilibrium model that fur-
thered Hall’s original concept by introducing stochastic household prefer-
ences. Their framework allows the coherent estimation of demand shifts
from the Euler equations. Any residual of the law of motion of preferences
can then be interpreted as demand shocks. By generating a series of de-
mand innovations that we …nd to best re‡ect the behavior of preferences
1For a critique on Temin’s methodology see Mayer (1980).
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during the Depression, we are able to show that the model economy takes
a path that is strikingly similar to historical data. In particular, our model
correctly predicts a recession setting in after 1929, it can account for more
than half of the decline in real GNP, most notably it generates a persistent
depression that lasts well over ten years and it goes through a recession in
1937-1938.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section will
set out the model. In Section 3, demand shocks will be estimated. Then,
we apply these shocks to the fully speci…ed model and compare results to
the empirical observation on key macroeconomic variables during the Great
Depression. Section 5 concludes.
2 The environment
The model is based on Baxter and King (1991) and Greenwood, Hercowitz
and Hu¤man (1988). Essentially, it is a standard one-sector Dynamic Gen-
eral Equilibrium model with variable capital utilization augmented by stochas-
tic preferences. The economy that we examine is populated with a large
number of identical consumer-workers households, each of which will live
and grow forever and each with identical preferences and technologies. Let
us start with the problem faced by a representative consumer-worker house-
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inclusive of the usual initial and transversality conditions. Here, 0 < ® < 1,
0 < ¯ < 1, 0 < ´ < 1, and µ > 1. ct, lt, xt, kt, ut and ¯ denote consumption,
labor, investment, capital, capital utilization rate and the discount factor re-
spectively. All variables are in detrended per capita terms. ¢t is a random
variable that a¤ects the subsistence level of consumption; it is zero in the
stationary state. A positive shock to ¢t generates an urge to consume in the
3
sense of an exogenous demand shock to consumption. Preference dynamics
are described by an autoregressive process of maximal order two.2 The pa-
rameter n is the deterministic rate of population growth and g designates
the deterministic rate of labor augmenting technical progress. The product
utkt denotes the ‡ow of capital services. As in most studies of variable cap-
ital utilization, the rate of depreciation, ±t, is an increasing function of the
utilization rate.3 The economy as a whole is a¤ected by organizational syn-
ergies that cause the output of an individual …rm to be higher if all other
…rms in the economy are producing more. At stands for these aggregate
externalities where bars over variables denote average economy-wide levels.
The production complementarities are taken as given for the individual op-
timizer and they cannot be priced or traded. Increasing returns to scale in
production are measured by °. All markets are perfectly competitive and
we consider symmetric equilibria only.
We will next describe the parametric speci…cation of the model and
assign parameter values. Calibration is now routine in a wide range of
macroeconomic areas. The following Table represents a typical calibration
(essentially Christiano and Harrison’s, 1999). The fundamental period in
the model is one year. The capital share is a third and the annual rate of
depreciation is eight percent. The discount factor is set so that the steady
state net return to capital is three percent. The labor force grows at a rate
of one percent per year and labor augmenting technology expands at an an-
nual 1.9 percent. These numbers were taken from Cole and Ohanian (1999)
and conform to Maddison (1991). Lastly, we set the increasing returns to
scale parameter to zero for the time being. In fact, we need limiting ° < 0:4
to rule out indeterminacy of rational expectations.4 The calibration implies
that, on an annual basis, capital is 2.57 times that of output. This value
agrees with the …ndings in Maddison (1991) who reports ratios of gross non-
residential capital stock to GDP at 2.91 (for 1913) and at 2.26 (for 1950).
The steady state consumption share of output amounts to 72 percent.
Table 1: Calibration
® ¯ ° ± g n
1=3 0:97 0 0:08 0:019 0:01
Let us denote bkt ´ (kt ¡ k)=k and b¢t ´ (¢t ¡ c)=c where omitting time
indices on variables indicates steady state values (the preference shifter is
2This gives way to some empirical results in the next section. There we show that a
second order process indeed decribes best the evolution of the preference shifter.
3Bresnahan and Ra¤ (1991) suggest that at least twenty percent of the aggregate
capital stock was idled between 1929 and 1933. Thus, variable capital utilization may be
an important factor for any model of the Great Depression.
4See Harrison and Weder (2001) for a sunspot based interpretation of the Great De-
pression.
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zero in the stationary state). Then, the model can be approximated and






















where M is a 3 £ 3 matrix (the Appendix presents the complete solution
of the model). An equilibrium is de…ned as a sequence fbkt+1; b¢tg1t=0 that
solves (1) subject to initial conditions as well as the transversality condition.
In the next section we will discuss the computation of demand shocks fdtg
which will then be used to shock the dynamical system (1) and to derive
output realizations for the arti…cial economy.
3 Will the real demand shock please stand up?
Technology shocks are customarily estimated as residuals from a Solow de-
composition. Put another way, these shocks are not directly observable and
measurement takes place within a particular model – a production func-
tion. Hall (1986, 1997), Parkin (1988), Bencivenga (1992) and especially
Baxter and King (1991) apply this methodology to measure demand shocks
as well. Their idea adapts from the …ndings that representative agent Euler
equations perform poorly. Inter alia, this suggests the notion of stochas-
tic preferences playing a potential role.5 In particular, the above authors
use the intratemporal …rst-order conditions to derive a sequence of demand






Thus, a positive innovation to ¢t represents a positive demand shock to
consumption for a given shadow value of wealth, ¸t. In another interpreta-
tion, one may think of ¢t a¤ecting the marginal rate of substitution between






A fall in ¢t will require a decline of labor supply at given levels of consump-
tion and of the remuneration of labor.
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Figure 1: Preference shifter
We Taylor-approximate the household’s two intratemporal optimality
conditions as6




In the following computation, steady state values for labor, l, are sample
means. Formulation (2) allows estimation results to be fed directly into the
linearized model. Given information on consumption, wage and labor input
allows us to estimate demand shocks. Our annual data on real consump-
tion expenditures on nondurables and services in 1972 dollars for 1919-1980
are from Balke and Gordon (1986) and the national income and product
accounts. Data were divided by the working-age population (16 years and
older). Wage data are average hourly earnings.7 Unfortunately, earnings
data are not available for all sectors in the beginning decades of the sample.
To maintain continuity of overall series, let us use wages in the manufactur-
ing sector only. In particular, we use Hanes’ (1996) compilation of National
Industrial Conference Board and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data.
For missing years (1919 to 1922 and World-War II years), we employ BLS
data on hourly wages directly – chained into Hanes’s data. We use the GNP
de‡ator to de‡ate the series. Lastly, labor input is measured as hours (in
manufacturing) times total nonfarm employment per capita (basic source of
data: www.bls.gov). The data-measured labor input was adjusted to match
a steady state equal to l = 0:20.
Figure 1 displays the computed series of the state of preferences, b¢t, over
the 1919 to 1980 period. The series centers around zero which mimics the
6The presence of preference shocks precludes estimating Euler equations with GMM
and therefore to compute the sequence of ¢t from the intratemporal equations directly.
7Our sample ends in 1980 because afterwards manufacturing wages divert from their
previous trend which is likely the consequence of structural changes within the economy
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Figure 2: U.S. output vs. preference shifts
construction of preferences in our model. Its mean is ¡0:0038. One read-
ily notices a striking plunge that distinguishes the early years of the Great
Depression. This gives cue to Temin’s (1976) proposition of a plummeting
consumption demand that derailed the economy. Furthermore, around 1937-
1938 the economy appears to have taken yet another smaller demand side
jolt. Figure 2 plots the time series of the change in the preference variable
and U.S. output growth. We see from this Figure that both series observe
high volatility before 1945. The preference variable covaries positively with
output for most of the time. The correlation of both series is 0.27 when the
whole time span is considered. For 1929 to 1939 we compute a correlation of
0.84; for 1950 to 1980 the correlation is 0.63. Notable exceptions of positive
comovements were the 1940s. During World War II, output exhibited ex-
cessive growth rates that were not matched by positive demand innovations
– this most likely re‡ects the dramatic increase of war-related government
expenditures. The second half of that decade (the Reconversion-period after
1945 to 1947 which is associated with a dramatic increase of measured ¢t
and the 1949-recession) is characterized by the opposite picture.
The current paper does not touch upon the question if the observed
preference drop after 1930 may re‡ect a regime change or a structural break.
In fact, the strategy that we will take on in the following exercise circumvents
such ideas and contrastingly interprets the detected decline of preferences as
an unfavorable sequence of large negative shocks. This conforms to a general
de…nition of the Great Depression as being di¤erent from other downturns
– Prescott (1999) classi…es the Great Depression as a magnitude larger than
the phenomenon that we normally coin ”the business cycle” – but does not
rely on assuming structural changes which were not operating during other
episodes.
There has been little work done on the way the dynamic process of pref-
erences should realistically be modelled, notably for the interwar period.
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This di¤ers from routinely assuming a simple …rst-order process for tech-
nology which has become the widely agreed upon speci…cation within the
Real Business Cycle approach. For the postwar period, Baxter and King
(1991) …nd that a …rst-order autoregressive process including a constant
and trend provides a good …t. We experimented with a number of possible
low-order processes – various …rst-order to third-order AR processes and ran-
dom walk speci…cations. Our …ndings can be summarized as follows. When
the dynamic process is of …rst-order, the process displays evidence of serial
correlations of residuals. This is no longer the case when we assume that
preferences are described by a second-order autoregressive process. On the
other hand, considering even higher order process does not deliver additional
statistically signi…cant coe¢cients. We …nd that a second-order autoregres-
sive process including constant and trend provides a good description of the









b¢t¡2 + dt (3)
R2 = 0:94; SE = 0:039; DW = 1:77:
The reported shock volatility appears large. This is the result of massive
shocks during the 1930s. In fact, when only the post-war period is consid-
ered, then the variance of shocks settles down to the ballpark of Baxter and
King’s (1993) number. Figure 3 plots the computed shocks for this process.
Not surprisingly, it yields large negative demand shifts in the early thirties.
In fact, from 1930 to essentially 1934, the economy is subject to unremitting
contractions striking from the demand side. Moreover, the 1930s are the
only period in which we measure negative shocks of that magnitude and
the volatility of demand shocks becomes remarkably smaller in the post-war
period. This corresponds to the …ndings reported in DeLong and Summers
(1986) who, however, arrive at their conclusion by using a considerably dif-
ferent methodology. In the following, we will check for robustness of these
results.
To begin with, we excluded the 1940s from the sample such to keep out
the e¤ects of World-War-II. This does not change results signi…cantly. In
particular, we again …nd dramatic negative demand shocks during the 1930s.
Alternatively, relationship (2) could be transformed to




where the tildes denote that variables were trend adjusted. The variables
were rendered stationary by de‡ating each variable by its long run (sample)
trend growth.8 Figure 4 graphs the resulting behavior of the preference
8We detrend real wages at a 1.87 percent annual rate. The constructed labor input
grows by half a percent per year. Per capita consumption was de‡ated by the annual
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Figure 4: Preference shifters
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shifter vis-a-vis the shifter derived from equation (2). When the series is
computed from the trend-adjusted equation (4), the mean is ¡0:0057. Thus,
regardless of which measure is used, the conclusion appears that the 1930s
are characterized by a sharp decline in ¢t. Both computed series virtually
overlap. The correlation of both series is 0.98 and it is 0.9989 for the 1929 to
1939 subperiod. We decided to simply use formulation (2) in the following
section.9
Lastly, one may object that the choice of manufacturing wages distorts
the results. However, manufacturing real wages and aggregate real wages
moved very parallel during the whole depression except for the year 1933 in
which manufacturing real wages diverged upwards (see for example Bordo,
Ecreg and Evans, 2000, Figure 1). Thus, using a constructed aggregate wage
measure instead would most likely have yielded the same preference plunge
for most of the Great Depression’s downturn phase and a similar pattern
for the entire recovery. We repeat the calculation of (2) by using aggregate
measures. In particular, we use Kendrick’s (1961) measure of total hours
and the total economy real wage (see Cole and Ohanian, 1999, for construc-
tion).10 The derived series has mean 0.002. Figure 5 displays the patterns of
the preference shifter given the two alternative labor market measures. Both
sequences move uniformly through the 1930s. The correlation of both series
is 0.98.11 Thus, independently of the sectors we observe an economy-wide
shift in preferences.12 In the end, I have decided in favor of using manu-
facturing wage data because of its higher quality and since it is consistently
available over a longer time span.
To sum up, this section suggests that a sequence of negative demand
shocks that started to slam the U.S. economy in 1930. In the following sec-
tion, we will use this result and confront the identi…ed demand innovations
with the theoretical model. It is only then that we can make any reason-
able judgements on the importance of these shocks along the dimensions
deepness and persistence of the Great Depression in the United States.
9Preferences are suspiciously nonstationary. Indeed, Dickey-Fuller tests indicate that
in levels the series fails to accept stationarity. We will return to the possibility of random
walk preferences in the next section. Yet, the general pictures remains largely the same
for other speci…cations of the driving process – they are available from the author upon
request.
10Steady state values are sample means.
11 In fact, when we take out the ”consumption-component” of the preference shifter
(thus computing ¡ bwt + l1¡lblt) both series still are highly correlated (½ = 0:96).
12One may interpret our …ndings as saying that wage distortion do not a¤ect the (es-
timated) demand shocks since agents are still free to chose consumption and leisure such
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Figure 6: Constant returns demand model
4 The model and the Great Depression
In this section we use the measured series of demand shocks and generate
model series of relevant variables. This constitutes an important test for
the relevance of the shocks that have been identi…ed in the previous section.
We will at …rst assume that the preference shifter follows a second-order
process. We will discuss the model economy having (i) constant returns to
scale in production and (ii) modest increasing returns in production.
We use the autoregressive process (3) to compute a shock series fdtg19391930.
Then we feed the disturbances into the model. We start shocking a model
which in 1929 settles in a stationary state. Here we act upon Balke and
Gordon’s (1986) computation of trend output which reveals that in that
year the U.S. economy was very near trend. Cole and Ohanian (1999) work
on a similar premise. Figure 6 contains plots of annual real U.S. GNP and of
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Figure 7: Increasing returns demand model
we have derived in the previous section. Both model and data series were
set so that output in 1929 equals 100 and both series refer to detrended (per
capita) …gures. As for the U.S. series, this was done by dividing output by
adult population and detrending by the average growth rate of real output
per adult (1.9 percent per year).
The key …nding is that the model economy predicts a drastic slowdown
in economic activity after 1929. Not only does the timing of the depression
match U.S. data, but the duration of the downturn appears to match as well.
At its trough, the model is 20 percent below trend. This is not quite as deep
as the U.S. recession – in 1933 the economy hovered 38 percent below trend.
Thus, the constant returns model can account for only about 50 percent
of the decline in real GNP. In contrast, the perfect markets Real Business
Cycle model predicts a decline of 15 percent (see Cole and Ohanian, 1999).13
The second …nding is that the model predicts a relatively slow recovery. In
particular, by 1939 output is still 16 percent below trend as opposed to the
27 percent divergence to trend in the data (the Real Business Cycle model
is above trend during the second half of the 1930s; see Cole and Ohanian,
1999). Lastly, the demand driven model predicts the 1937-1938 recession
correctly in timing and deepness – the model replicates the two dips that
we observe in 1930s data. There are some di¤erences between the behavior
of the model economy and the behavior of the U.S. economy during this
episode. Most notably, the cycle’s trough does not coincide with data. The
model lags by about one year. Put in other words, the speed with which
the collapse of production takes place is slower in the model. Overall, the
model can capture the general pattern of the Great Depression, yet the
model depression is not quite as deep and precipitous as found in data.
Let us now turn to the role of increasing returns in production and
13Ohanian (2001) questions the ”standard” meaning of measured technology shocks.
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inquire whether externalities can propagate the shocks in such a way as
to help bring model and data even closer together. Re‡ecting on recent
estimates for the U.S. economy (see for example Basu and Fernald, 2000, and
references therein), scale economies are thought to be small. Bernanke and
Parkinson (1993) conclude that data suggests signi…cant increasing returns
in the 1920s and 1930s.14 Burns (1933) also points to some evidence for
increasing returns. We set ° = 0:15 which is not empirically implausible but
on the upper end of acceptable calibrations. The upshot from considering
increasing returns is that now output takes an even deeper dive (Figure 7).
At its trough, the model output is 31 percent below trend which almost
matches data. Yet, the downward pressure arising from the demand side
appears to become most crucial during the second half of the thirties. By
1939, the arti…cial economy and US output have converged – the model is
at 27 percent below trend. Increasing returns have the e¤ect of providing a
stronger propagation mechanism. We conclude that when we combine the
measured demand shocks with a modest increasing returns to scale economy,
then most of the decline in economic activity is accounted for.
Next, we look at the movements of GNP components and factor inputs.
Figures 8 to 10 report the pattern of consumption, investment, and labor
input vis-a-vis their data equivalents. Consumption is expenditures on non-
durables and services. Investment is measure by business …xed investment.
To make data comparable to the model, labor input in the data series is to-
tal hours worked. Once again, both the increasing returns model and data
series were set such that variables in 1929 equal 100 and all series refer to
detrended versions. First of all, each variable drops sharply coinciding with
the pattern that we …nd for the U.S. economy. Particularly, investment and
consumption move in the same direction at impact – when the 1930 demand
shock hits. This would not have been the case would capital utilization be
constant. Model hours track data closely. Investment tumbles to 70 percent
below trend as opposed to 78 percent found in the data. On the other hand,
consumption appears to be too smooth in the model. It falls by 16 per-
cent whereas the U.S. economy displays a 28 percent decline. This suggests
other forces (such as credit rationing) being at work that we did not capture
here.15 16
Finally, our results should be compared to the prediction of other models.
As stressed in the introduction, a successful theory of the Great Depression
should account for the slow recovery. In the following, we will apply a test
that discriminates between model performances during that period. We
follow Fair and Shiller (1990) who check the forecasting ability by evaluat-
14See also Bordo and Evans (1995).
15Labor productivity falls in the increasing returns model by three percent, thus, not
to the extent of the observed 12 percent decline in U.S. data.
16The Appendix presents a discussion by considering an alternative formulation of the
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ing the information content of endogenous model output through the lens
of a regression. To this end, we apply a test in which we assess the in-
formation contained in the constant returns and in the increasing returns
demand-driven model’s forecasts compared to that in two supply driven Real
Business Cycle models. Those are Cole and Ohanian’s (2000, Tables 12 and
13) competitive model, yCOMPt , and their cartel model, y
CARTEL
t , which
incorporates important elements of New Deal labor and industrial policies.
Cole and Ohanian claim that their cartel model can account for a large por-
tion of the tepid recovery.17 Regression of annual U.S. output (detrended
levels from 1934 to 1939) on the three models’ output yields the following



















We understand from these three-way tests that the demand driven model,
y¢t , provides statistically signi…cant information for U.S. output while the
two competitors do not. Phrased di¤erently: once the demand model is
included, the two other contestants appear to have no informational power.
Moreover, we obtain negative coe¢cients for the cartel-model. That picture
















Now, the cartel-model contributes signi…cant information. Both models end
up in a draw. Judging the overall performance, the demand-driven model
fares at least as good as its considered contenders. Our …ndings suggest that
shocks to demand were important factors during the 1930s.
Finally, we will extend the simulation past the year 1939. Demand shifts
are represented by the second-order process (3) and the model starts in
steady state in 1929. Figure 14 shows model and data growth rates of
output. First, we observe that the volatility of both economy declines sig-
ni…cantly after World-War-II. Second, the model volatility is 90 percent that
of U.S. output growth’s volatility. In terms of Prescott’s (1986) original mo-
tivation of Real Business Cycle theory, the model can explain a material
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Figure 11: Output growth model vs. U.S.
fraction of observed economic ‡uctuations. Third, the correlation of both
series is 0.26 for 1930 to 1980 which questions the model’s ability to account
for most of the U.S. business cycle and which suggest other, largely orthog-
onal, shocks. However, when the War years are excepted, the comovement
improves. The series’ correlation rises to 0.84 for the 1930s and to 0.49 for
the 1950 to 1980 subperiod. Thus, when excluding the e¤ects of World-War
II, demand shocks may constitute the source of a weighty portion of the
United States business cycle. Put di¤erently, demand disturbances appear
to have exercised an unusual toil during the Depression years. To a certain
extend, they seem less important for the post-war period, yet, as also noted
by Hall (1997), they represent an important factor for our understanding of
the post-war cycle.
5 Concluding remarks
If our argument is correct, disturbances on the demand side may have played
a central role during the Great Depression. Indeed we can identify from Eu-
ler equation residuals a number of unusually large negative demand shocks
bunched in the 1930s. These appear to have derailed the U.S. economy.
This echoes the view originally promoted by Temin (1976) and it supports
his theory that consumption declined in a atypical manner for cycles dur-
ing the that period. We apply these measured demand shocks to a dynamic
general equilibrium model and …nd that size and sequence of shocks can gen-
erate a pattern of the model economy that is not unlike data. The model
grants demand shocks a major role in both generating the economic down-
turn as well as exaggerating persistence. Noteworthy is the model’s ability
to account for the lion’s share of the decline in economic activity – if we ac-
cept the presence of modest increasing returns to scale, then demand shocks
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can account for almost all the deepness of the depression. Furthermore, the
speeds of adjustment in the model parallel those in the Great Depression
which were much slower than in other recessions. The demand-driven model
performs particularly well between 1934 and 1939. Undoubtedly, other fac-
tors contributed to the Depression, and adding them to the model may likely
enhance the match to data even further. We leave this to another project.
This being said, two …nal issues emerge: (i) what exactly are the demand
shocks and (ii) was the Great Depression suboptimal after all? Until now we
have interpreted shifts of ¢t plainly as exogenous consumption shocks. This
follows the traditional Keynesian argument of animal spirits or sunspots that
cause erratic movements of aggregate demand. However, a potential pitfall
of this interpretation is that the measured preference shifts are serially cor-
related. By drawing strictly on the indeterminacy literature (see Farmer,
1993), this would stand in con‡ict to the rational expectations assumption
– besides the model does not display multiple equilibria of any sorts. Yet,
one could also think that the shocks are a stand-in for something di¤erent.
For example, Hansen and Prescott (1993) defend technology shocks as re-
ally being about government restrictions and in the present case a change
of the preference shifter could represent exogenous factors somehow a¤ect-
ing the intratemporal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.
However, no candidate policy parameter (in particular distortionary tax-
ation) appears to display any signi…cant change: tax rates on capital and
labor changed very little during the 1929 to 1933 period (see Joines, 1981).
An alternative interpretation which stands closer to the ”standard” demand
side version relates to the arti…cial economy’s asset pricing implications and
would stress on exogenous changes in the aversion towards risk.18 In the
model, high values of ¢t mean high risk aversion which imply a high equity
premium. Consequently, predicted asset returns are high and price-dividend
ratios are low. As displayed in Figure 1, ¢t falls dramatically at the on-
set of the Great Depression indicating a fall of risk aversion. Therefore,
the interpretation evolves that agents perceived this fall beforehand - thus
the surge of stock prices prior to 1929 with subsequent low returns. Even
though this interpretation appears observationally equivalent to the case of
”standard” demand shocks, it demonstrates that the correct asset pricing
sequence is implied. Another interpretation follows Prescott (1999) who ad-
vances the view that labor market institutions and the ”rules of the game”
may be essential in explaining phenomena like the Great Depression in the
United States, the current bust in Japan or high unemployment in Europe.
In particular, Prescott argues that the fall in hours worked in Japan dur-
ing the 1990s re‡ects agents’ desire to substitute in favor of more leisure.
Therefore, the preference shift that was identi…ed in this paper may simply
parallel the hypothesis laid out by Prescott: following the buoyant 1920s the
18 I would like to thank Harald Uhlig for pointing this out to me.
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United States chose to consume smaller volumes of goods, work less and cor-
respondingly run down economic activity. The drop of ¢t expresses a change
of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure (note
that in data and in the arti…cial economy the consumption share rises af-
ter 1929).19 It appears that more work should be done in identifying the
economics behind the preference shift and we plan to pursue this in future
research.
This leads us to the second issue. Since …scal actions apparently did not
induce the economic decline, the Depression as characterized throughout a
large portion of our discussion, emerges as a voluntary phenomenon absent of
any sort of market failures. In particular, if production is constant returns,
then the estimated changes in preferences call upon a signi…cant decline
of output after 1929. Put alternatively, about half of the deepness of the
decline can be interpreted as optimal response. Surely, this leaves open
what caused the rest of the slump and to what extent those factors …t
this characterization. Moreover, this straightforward conclusion no longer
holds in second-best environments with increasing returns. This points to
increasing returns not only acting as the magnifying channel that produces
a large slump. Production complementarities also represent an essential
source of coordination failure that allows the interpretation of the Great
Depression as a nonoptimal event.
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6 Appendix
6.1 The model in more detail





































and a transversality condition.
The preference shifter ¢t is zero in the steady state. In balanced growth,








+ 1 ¡ ±
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which allows to compute y=k. From the …rst order condition with respect





= 1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ µ):




1¡®(1+°) (1 + n) ¡ (1 ¡ ±) = x
k
which yields the steady state investment share.
The linearized model is given by




blt = byt ¡ bct + b¢t
b±t = byt ¡ bkt
¡(1 + g)
(1¡®)(1+°)
1¡®(1+°) (bct ¡ b¢t)
= ¡¯[®y
k





















b¢t+1 = 1:221257b¢t ¡ 0:320895b¢t¡1 + dt
(or
b¢t+1 = b¢t + dt
with a random walk process).
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where !t+1 ´ Etbxt+1 ¡ bxt+1 is the expectations error. Given that we do
not consider cases of indeterminacy, one eigenvalue of M will be outside
the unit circle. We apply Farmer’s (1993, chapter 7) method to solve for
the unique solution. We premultiply (5) by Q¡1, the inverse of the matrix
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Suppose that ¸1 > 1. From Etv1t+1 = 0, this yields
z1t = 0
thus a linear combination of bxt with bkt, b¢t, and b¢t¡1. This allows to
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which is equation (1) in the main text.
6.2 Alternative driving process
Here we will demonstrate the robustness of our results. First, we will con-
sider an alternative speci…cation of the shock process. Then we will compute
model output past the Great Depression era.
As mentioned in footnote 8, preferences are suspiciously nonstationary.
Indeed, Dickey-Fuller tests indicate that in levels the series fails to accept
stationarity. Thus, we close our presentation by assuming an alternative
driving process of the preference shifter. We consider the following random
walk process to describe demand shocks





R2 = 0:06; SE = 0:041; DW = 1:40:
Compared to (3), the …t worsens which makes this formulation less appeal-
ing. The regressors are no longer statistically signi…cant as was the case in
the AR(2) speci…cation. Furthermore, the shock volatility increases. Figure
11 plots the shock sequence that results from the regression. We …nd large
negative demand shocks for the 1930s whose magnitude is not observable
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Figure 14: Consumption
speci…cations. Figure 12 and 13 display the behavior of the model and data
output given the calibration of the constant returns economy. The deepness
and persistence of the Great Depression are captured by this model: output
is now 34 percent below trend at trough. Moreover, the model replicates the
double dip that we observe in data. Consumption follows a less of a smooth
pattern than with AR(2) shock process: it is 23 percent below trend at its
trough which is not ill-matching the 25 percent of U.S. consumption. Thus,
when allowing for the possibility of a random walk preference process, then
departures from constant returns to scale are no longer needed to explain a
substantial share of the Great Depression.
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